Man in no hurry

September 8, 2006

By Yossi Verter

It looked this week as if Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was losing control. Every day he had to wipe the egg off his face anew. At the beginning of the week, he learned that the state comptroller was recommending that the attorney general open criminal proceedings against him in connection with the political appointments affair. In the middle of the week, he and his finance minister became embroiled in the fiasco of presenting the budget, and thereafter, he got a punch in the face from the attorney general, who disqualified two of his candidates for the war inquiry committee: Brigadier General (res.) Yedidya Yaari and Major General (res.) David Ivri.

Even Olmert's loyal confidants - the master spinners who, in the days of Ariel Sharon, knew how to control the headlines - sounded despairing. "Everyone feels free to kick a stupid dog," one of them said. Another drew a comparison between these times and the middle of Benjamin Netanyahu's tenure as prime minister, when he became entangled in a fatal spiral of loss of popularity and credibility. The good news in such a comparison is that Netanyahu succeeded in surviving another year before the Knesset forced early elections on him. It is not sure that Olmert has another year left. And if we assume he does, what will he do in that year?

This week the prime minister adopted a typical Sharon-like tactic: He tried to create options. On Wednesday, he met with Zevulun Orlev of the National Religious Party, Moshe Gafni of United Torah Judaism, Reuven Rivlin of the Likud and cabinet ministers Shalom Simhon of Labor and Yacov Ben-Yizri of the Pensioners' Party. Just like Sharon who, when he sensed trouble in the air, would hasten to invite his political opponents to a meeting and set off a wave of rumors about a national unity government or a reshuffle. For some reason, however, this formula did not work for Olmert. The meetings he held did not seem to garner much attention.

Some of the people who have spoken to the prime minister have the impression that he is waiting to see how things develop in the coming weeks in the Labor Party, and with the budget, before making decisions. He did not give them the impression that he is determined to get rid of Labor quite so easily. It is possible that he would prefer to wait until May 2007, when the party is due to hold its "primaries," in the hopes that Amir Peretz will lose the leadership and someone else will replace him in the Defense Ministry.

"Anyone else would be preferable to us," Olmert's people say. "Ehud Barak, Ami Ayalon, Matan Vilnai, Danny Yatom. If it turns out to be Avishay Braverman or Ophir Pines, we'll give them the treasury. Just let Peretz go."

On the other hand, it is not clear that Olmert can wait another nine months. If Peretz does not manage to gain control of his faction, the prime minister will have to act. Some of his aides are suggesting that he do so already now, during the Knesset summer recess, when there is no danger of his being voted out of office. These aides do not understand why he is in no hurry to make a move, and wonder whether he has not perhaps lost his self-confidence.

The person who was not invited to this week's round of talks was the one who is most touted as a future partner to Olmert in this government: Avigdor Lieberman. Adding the Yisrael Beitenu faction to the coalition with its 11 soldiers seems like a real option. There is support for such a move in the prime minister's inner circle; some of his close advisors have proposed that he offer Lieberman the Finance Ministry. Lieberman's presence in the coalition could help to boost the poor image of Olmert and his Kadima party in the eyes of the new immigrants.

On Tuesday Olmert met with MK Marina Solodkin, from his own party, who had been slated for immigration absorption minister originally, but remained outside the cabinet.

"Marina, how are we faring with the Russian-speaking man-in-the street?" Olmert asked.

"Nothing to write home about," Solodkin replied. She asked Olmert to intervene with authorities in Russia so that veteran immigrants who arrived before 1992 would get government pensions from it.

"I'll take you with me when I go to Russia in October," Olmert told her. "You'll be able to discuss it with [President Vladimir] Putin."

Kadima-Likud ties

As soon as this week's inauguration ceremony of the first Kadima branch was over - it happened to take place in Tiberias - the party's ministers and Knesset members climbed into their ministerial Volvos and parliamentary Mazdas and charged off to a nearby wedding hall, where Likud central committee member Moshe Saban was marrying off his daughter. In addition to the Likud MKs, Kadima ministers Roni Bar-On, Ze'ev Boim and Gideon Ezra were all in attendance, as were MKs Tzachi Hanegbi, Yoel Hasson and Eli Aflalo. All of them former Likud members.

Ezra participated the day before in the wedding of the daughter of another Likud central committee member, in Nes Tziona; the day before that, he had gone together with Finance Minister Avraham Hirchson, who took off from the budget debate, and Boim, to the wedding of yet another daughter of a Likud central committee member, this time in Moshav Bnei Zion. One would have thought there had been no "big bang," no split in the Likud. One would have thought there was no bad blood. If once upon a time, before the elections, the leaders of Kadima had boycotted such events and spoken to the Likud members with their noses in the air, today they speak to them at eye level - if not from lower down than that.

The participation by Kadima members in celebrations of Likud central committee members is a phenomenon of the recent past. There is more and more talk in Kadima and the Likud of reuniting, of mending fences. In both parties, they read the polls and see that while Kadima is losing about half of its support, not all of the votes are going to the Likud. The conclusion being reached by leading activists in both parties is that the split was an unnatural move that sprang from personal grudges and uncontrolled urges.

Now that the realignment plan is no longer on the agenda, what really divides the two parties, other than personal enmity between Olmert and Bibi? There are no substantial differences over economics. The same is true of diplomatic issues. The great strategic challenge - Iran - is something which unites rather than divides the parties. What in fact will prevent Kadima and the Likud from uniting into one body before the elections?

At this point, Netanyahu is not excited about the prospect. "Why should we merge?" he asks. "Let those who left return home, to the Likud." Three days ago, he held a meeting in Washington with Vice President Dick Cheney and they discussed "the Iranian threat." This meeting was part of Netanyahu's political strategy: He tries to look like someone who is dealing with national affairs, with matters of the Jewish people, while Olmert is splashing around in the murky waters of petty politics.

Our analyst's insights

One can hardly expect Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami - the major victim of the state commission of inquiry concerning the riots in the Arab sector in October, 2000 - to say a good word about inquests of this type.

The regulations concerning formation of commission are "draconian," he says, "and must be purged from our legislation. This is something that is awful and has no parallel anywhere in the world: People who, let us say, conduct affairs of state in an inexperienced way, who trip up, are treated as if they are accused. They take a government, a governing body, executives, accompanied by lawyers, and put them up in front of a commission that is, by definition, a court whose sole purpose is to hand out a verdict and find who is guilty."

The Orr Commission ruled that Ben-Ami, who served as internal security minister (and foreign minister) in the Barak government, could not receive the security portfolio in a future government. This ridiculous veto does not cause sleepless nights to one of the brightest and most original politicians who ever served in an Israeli cabinet. Today, as an observer from the sidelines of the debate being held in Israeli society, he sees clear indications of the weakness of the political system which, he believes, is a captive of the legal system.

"Had they set up a state commission of inquiry after the first intifada in 1978, they would probably have found that Yitzhak Rabin, who was then defense minister, could no longer assume that post in the future. After all, Rabin spent 10 days in the United States after the first riots. And when he returned home, he did not understand what exactly was happening ... The commission would have asked him why he did not have an assessment, why he did not predict, why there were no intelligence data, why he was so slow in reacting, and they would have found that 'Mr. Security' was not fit to serve as defense minister."

The Israeli dialogue, Ben-Ami says, is oversimplified and superficial. It consists of politicians' statements that "a commission of inquiry must be set up" and "that this person is not suitable, so I should replace him."

Ben-Ami: "They throw out names, including those of Barak and Bibi. Were they really any better? Barak was not a good defense minister. The one who controlled the defense establishment was [Shaul] Mofaz. There is no difference between the eras of Barak and Netanyahu and what we have now. Sharon was a master. But the greatest of those with experience were not successful - neither in the face of the challenges from the outside, nor vis-a-vis the domestic political establishment."

Ben-Ami has made an international career for himself as a lecturer, writer of articles and books, and a member of international organizations and research institutes. Amir Peretz, he believes, has ended his career. With or without a commission, he is finished, says Ben-Ami. He has no credibility, not with the public, not with the party and not within the political system.

Ben-Ami believes that new elections now, however, will bring about an even more fragmented Knesset. Perhaps a body should be set up with new people that can bring about a radical change? The global agenda is too big for anyone who comes to power to handle, he feels. At the same time, all those who achieve power renounce their predecessors' actions and try to reinvent the wheel anew. From the road map to disengagement to convergence.

"All the wheels have already been invented," Ben-Ami says. "We have to change the disc, to go for international support, to go for the international community. To end this dependence on America. It has a long time ago lost its ability to build confidence, to build coalitions. Precisely the limping end to this war is what creates a chance for a diplomatic breakthrough. The time has come now to come to terms with things that in the past we degraded, such as an international solution to the conflict. It is time now to go back to living in the State of Israel that we inhabited before 1967. Our lives were not so bad then."

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While reading and researching an article, I sometimes like to read also the comment’s left by other reader’s and below was one that was left with this particular article from a person named Alex:

The 25 Rules of disinformation


AKA The politician?s bible. Sharon lived his life according to these rules, right down to the last one. No reason why Olmert won`t do the same.

1. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil
2. Become incredulous and indignant
3. Create rumormongers
4. Use a straw man
5. Sidetrack opponents with name calling, ridicule
6. Hit and Run
7. Question motives
8. Invoke authority
9. Play Dumb
10. Associate opponent charges with old news
11. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions
12. Enigmas have no solution
13. Alice in Wonderland Logic
14. Demand complete solutions
15. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions
16. Vanish evidence and witnesses
17. Change the subject
18. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad
19. Ignore facts, demand impossible proofs
20. Falsify evidence
21. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor
22. Manufacture a new truth
23. Create bigger distractions
24. Silence critics
25. Vanish