Iraq Myths Floor Bush

Column

5 August 2007

By James J. Zogby

The war in Iraq was lost even before it began, for one important reason: the Bush Administration did not consider it important to earn the trust and support of the public. In the lead-up to the fighting in Iraq, the Bush Administration did not tell the American people the truth about why we were invading Iraq, or what would be the expected costs and consequences that would result from that action. Instead, they relied on hype and created myths to justify the war.

In this context, it is important to recall all of the myths the Bush Administration developed to sell the war - and not just the fudged intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and the supposed connection to the attacks of September 11, 2001.

In speeches and debates, advocates for the war downplayed its costs and consequences.

We were told it would be quick and relatively painless: a massive show of "shock and awe" followed by a few weeks of fighting and maybe a few more months to clean up. One Pentagon official estimated: 90,000 troops, six months and a few billion dollars - Iraqi oil revenue funding the reconstruction effort.

After victories in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and the war in the Balkans in 1996-1999, this was the kind of high tech war that Americans had come to expect, with limited US casualties and minimal "collateral damage".

At the same time we were told that US forces would overthrow the dictator and his hated regime, be greeted as liberators and preside as midwife to the birth of a fledgling democracy that could serve as a "beacon for the entire Middle East".

Our early polling, at Zogby International, showed how important these myths were for American public support. If the mythic scenarios became the actual trajectory of the war, the American people would support it. But when asked projective questions that supposed alternative scenarios playing out, support dropped precipitously.

Substantial majorities said they would be unlikely to support the war if it turned out to last more than one year, take more than 1,000 American lives or 10,000 Iraqi lives.

Unprepared

But since most Americans were unprepared for these outcomes, they supported the Bush Administration's march to war.

The myth-making continued. A group of US servicemen took down the statue of Saddam Hussain in Baghdad, but staged the event in front of a small gathering of cheering Iraqis. Then Bush, in a flight jacket, landed on an aircraft carrier to announce the end of major combat operations before an enormous banner stating "Mission Accomplished". For a time, public support for the war remained strong.

But then reality hit, and the myths began to unravel: no weapons of mass destruction were found, bringing pre-war intelligence claims into question. The war continued and casualties mounted. An insurgency took hold in Iraq. Polling of Iraqis showed discontent with what they termed "occupation" as lawlessness and insecurity ran rife in Baghdad.

The White House and Pentagon began to work overtime to construct new rationales and myths to shore up flagging public support. The insurgents were termed "dead enders" and "remnants of the old regime" or "foreign terrorists" and we were promised that their days were numbered. The Pentagon ordered that no coffins of American dead be shown and Iraqi hospitals were forbidden to issue casualty reports.

As the war grew more intense, new tactics were tried. "Political progress" in the form of a series of referenda and elections were presented as evidence of victory. And in speeches, Bush and his surrogates upped the rhetorical ante. "We are fighting them there so we don't have to fight them here," "these were the same people who attacked us on 9-11," and the insurgents, terrorists and competing militias in Iraq were lumped together with Al Qaida and Iran into an international movement seeking world conquest and the establishment of the "Caliphate" - reminiscent of the Cold War rhetoric warning of the global communist threat.

Despite these efforts, however, the realities of the war have persisted and taken a toll on public opinion. Our early polling has been validated. It has gone on too long, not gone well, and taken too many lives. The myths have been shattered, and the public has stopped believing.

Damage done

Despite the damage done, we must heed Senator Barack Obama's warning not to be as careless in leaving Iraq as we were in entering. We have obligations to regional security, our allies and friends in the Middle East, and to the Iraqi people to help prepare the ground for a regional political solution that will provide a modicum of stability in Iraq. We cannot now slip into isolationism when so much needs to be done to rebuild trust and confidence with allies and friends who deserve our support.

It's a tall order, to clean up this mess that's been left in Iraq and the broader region. The way to start is learning the lesson of this war: tell the truth to the American people.

Dr James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute in Washington, DC.