The Palestinian Intifada 1987
THE UPRISING ORIGINS AND DIRECTIONS
On 9th December, following a car accident in the Gaza Strip in which four Palestinians were killed, a period of sustained popular protest began which has become known as the uprising. The causes of this movement cannot be found in the individual events, which preceded the accident. Neither is the uprising simply a "spontaneous" expression of frustration with military occupation. The uprising can only be explained within the context of twenty years of political struggle between Israel and the Palestinians.
During this period Israel has attempted to consolidate the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, while exploiting its human and material resources for its own economic purposes. In opposition, the Palestinian national movement has been working to bring the occupation to an end. It is the dynamics of the conflict between these two opposing movements which have led to the current uprising, which represents a distinctive new phase in the struggle for an independent state.
Israeli Policy Towards the West Bank and Gaza
Israeli policies and practices since 1967 have aimed at affecting all aspects of life in the occupied territories; through controlling the political, economic, and social institutions, the occupation has sought to force the Palestinians into submission and to make them accept the status quo of military rule.
Israel has sought to reap the greatest possible economic benefit from the occupation, through a variety of legal and administrative measures instituted for that purpose.
The aggressive Israeli policy of land expropriation carried out over the past twenty years has resulted in the loss of 52% and 42% of the land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively. Land has been confiscated both for "security reasons" and for the construction of Israeli settlements, which have proliferated throughout the years of occupation.
Israeli control over water resources has also progressed rapidly, and has been a major cornerstone of the policy of control over the land. Legislation enacted by the Israelis stipulates that the amount of water allowed for Palestinian use should not exceed 90 to 100 million cubic meters annually until the year 2010. This means that Palestinians must maintain their water usage at the present level over the next two decades, while the Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be granted a 100% increase in the amount of water they can use during the 1980s.
The Palestinian economy as a whole has been subject to a systematic policy of destruction. In addition to the appropriation of vital land and water resources, the Israelis have weakened the ability of Palestinian agricultural produce to compete with Israeli produce in the captive market which has been created since 1967. To this end, Israel has imposed production quotas on Palestinian farmers, and has systematically denied them the subsidies it provides to Israeli producers.
Palestinian industry and commerce are similarly restricted. Industrial enterprises are denied subsidies, and the granting of import licenses is almost exclusively restricted to Israelis. The granting of licenses to establish productive enterprises is subject to many restrictions; in Gaza, where citrus products comprise 70% of exports, Palestinians planning to establish a fruit canning plant were denied a permit to do so.
The exploitation of Palestinian laborers working in Israeli enterprises is the most vivid example of the colonial situation created since 1967. The low wages paid to Palestinian workers and the fact that they do not enjoy the social benefits provided to Israeli workers have made them into a source of great profit to the Israeli
economy. Palestinian fund and social security contributions are deducted from their salaries without being returned upon retirement.
The Israelis also reap enormous benefits from the various kinds of taxes and duties levied on Palestinians in the occupied territories. Figures for 1986 indicate that $150 million were channelled into the Israeli treasury from taxes and customs duties alone. Another $250 million were raised from water fees, and an estimated $470 million from tourism.
It is clear from the above that the occupation is a highly profitable enterprise for the Israelis.
The profits enjoyed by the Israeli occupation authorities are made possible by the minimization of expenditure for services rendered to the population of the occupied territories. The health sector is symptomatic of this willful neglect. Indices of unequal health services include the number of hospital beds, the per capita expenditure on health care, and the number of physicians per person. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have one tenth of the number of hospital beds per person available in Israel, while the per capita government expenditure on health is 8% of that spent in Israel. The ratio of physicians to population is one to 1000 as compared to 29 to 1000 in Israel. The latter statistic is particularly telling in view of the 320 unemployed doctors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are unable to find work in the underdeveloped public health sector.
The low level of expenditure in other areas of Palestinian life is also well documented. Public education, social welfare services, and municipal public works are examples of sectors kept underdeveloped by the Israeli occupation authorities.
Measures Taken Against the Palestinians since 1982
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Political killings 53 9 10 13 21 28
Deportations 0 1 4 30 11 8
Administrative detentions 0 0 0 129 3 143
House demolitions and sealings 18 22 3 51 77 109
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(Source: MERIP no. 150, Jan/Feb 1988)
These Israeli policies have been met over the past twenty years by sustained Palestinian resistance in many forms. Resistance, in turn, has been met by harsh measures. The record of Israeli repression of the Palestinian people under occupation is long and varied. It includes acts of collective and individual punishment such as destruction of homes and property, imposition of curfews on whole communities, forced closure of institutions and enterprises, the killing of hundreds of people, deportation of thousands of individuals, and the arbitrary arrest and detention of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The table above summarizes some of these measures taken against Palestinians since 1982.
Palestinian Resistance to Occupation
Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories has not been restricted to fighting Israeli policies forced upon the population. It has also developed in response to political and diplomatic activities viewed by the Palestinians as detrimental to and often aimed at suppressing their national aspirations. The most prominent of these struggles was waged in 1976 when the Israeli authorities tried, unsuccessfully, to put forth a "new leadership" through the holding of municipal elections. They hoped that the new "leadership" would accept the autonomy scheme subsumed under the rubric of the "Civil Administration", and that the demands for national sovereignty could be finally thwarted.
The Palestinian uprising of 1976 responded to these designs by electing nationalist figures into office. The elections were viewed as a popular referendum which dealt a decisive blow to the “Civil Administration” scheme designed to deprive Palestinians of national independence.
The uprising of 1979/80 was also directed against political efforts to stifle Palestinian demands for self-determination. Like the "Civil Administration" scheme, the Camp David accords negotiated by Anwar Sadat in Jerusalem and Washington were also designed to limit Palestinian authority to administrative matters, while keeping military and security affairs in the hands of Israel. Palestinian resistance to the Camp David version of autonomy was widespread: the clear demands of that time were the right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
The Palestinian national movement also took a prominent role in pressing for the abrogation of the Jordanian-Palestinian accords which did not satisfy Palestinian demands for self-determination and statehood. The confederation with Jordan envisioned in these agreements also relegated the PLO to a peripheral role and denied it its status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
The Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories has developed and matured over the past twenty years and has consolidated a broad consensus on clear and realistic objectives for the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the diaspora. These objectives are national independence through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the leadership of the PLO, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homeland. The movement has also developed a strong social foundation of grass-roots organization, and has thus been able to foil Israeli and Jordanian attempts to create an alternative leadership in the form of the Village Leagues or pro-Jordanian personalities such as Elias Freij and Rashad al-Shawwa. These attempts failed largely due to the fact that these groups and personalities lacked a genuine social base, and were therefore unable to attract a mass following.
Uprising
The December uprising in the occupied territories can only be understood within this historical context of increasing political maturity and organization at the mass level. The current uprising thus represents one phase in the history of the Palestinian national movement. Nevertheless, it is unique in its wide scope and intensity, in the clarity of its political content, and in the unity and maturity of
In terms of the scope and intensity of the confrontations between the Palestinians and the Israeli occupier, it is striking that in its first 100 days the uprising witnessed a daily average of one martyr, about 25 wounded, and 40 arrested. In addition, the confrontations have taken place in all sectors of Palestinian society, in cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps, and have involved individuals of all ages and social backgrounds. The demonstrations have also taken unprecedented proportions: those with over 1000 participants have been frequent, especially in heavily populated areas.
The Israeli response to this unprecedented uprising has been to take unprecedented measures to suppress it. Curfews of long duration have been imposed upon many areas; at one time in February, 25 communities in the Nablus area were placed under curfew, depriving over 135,000 persons of freedom of movement and means of earning their livelihood. The Nablus area curfew lasted 13 days.
The intensity of the confrontations led to a brutal policy of breaking limbs, introduced and justified by the Defense Minister himself. Thousands of Palestinian men, women, and children can testify to the wholesale assault on their persons.
Palestinians have responded collectively by breaking curfew orders, and by determining for their own communities the hours during which they conduct their commercial affairs. The commercial strikes have been tremendously successful,
despite the persistent efforts of the Israeli army to impose its own timetable for the opening and closing of places of business. Palestinians have also been successful in hindering or preventing, often for days at a time, army penetration of their communities, especially in refugee camps and villages. The army has thus resorted to the increased use of helicopters to move soldiers into barricaded communities, to pursue youths over the hilly terrain, and to drop tear gas into areas inaccessible to their ground forces.
At a different level, the uprising has been characterized by the spirit of unity and a high level of organization. Both qualities have been demonstrated clearly in the field. Demonstrations and conflict with the army have not been restricted to any one group among Palestinians. All have taken part. "Unified" popular committees have kept watch at night in an effort to provide some protection for villages and refugee camps against settlers' vigilante raids. Unified relief committees have been set up to distribute food and clothing to camps and villages under siege, and supplies have been collected from Palestinians from all walks of life. "Field committees" have also been established to administer the daily requirements and needs of the struggle. The committees have been able to overcome narrow special interests, and to work for the common good.
In addition, there has been no dissonance in the various calls for steps to be taken during the uprising. The common and narrow calculus of special interests, more familiar at other times, has not arisen in discussions and planning pertaining to the uprising.
This unity in the field has been reflected in unity of demands. The demands and slogans of the uprising have revolved around the need to implement United Nations resolutions concerning the protection of the civilian population in the occupied territories from the indiscriminate attacks of the army. The demands have also included putting an end to deportations, mass arrests, killings, beatings, the imposition of curfews, and the withdrawal of the army from populated areas (given that its presence is the chief provocative agent in these areas). Moreover, the national movement has called for the abolition of taxes imposed by the occupation authorities, since these taxes are levied upon the occupied population in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Demands have also been made for the reopening of schools, colleges and universities. All educational institutions in the West Bank have been closed by military order.
While these demands have been central in the uprising, the long-term vision of the solution to the Palestinian problem has not been neglected. The slogans of the uprising have been very clear: there is no possibility for a permanent solution without the participation of the PLO, the acceptance of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Leaflets distributed, bearing the signature of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, have also emphasized that the most suitable vehicle for arriving at a peace settlement is an international conference with full authority and which includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as the PLO.
The demands of the uprising have not only been clear; there has also been a consensus around them. This is obvious from the statements and leaflets issued by the leadership of the uprising and its popular committees. The political content of these declarations has been especially clear, and in particular the demand for national independence. This demand is also the main message of slogans chanted by demonstrators and painted on walls throughout the occupied territories.
But the process of outlining the salient features of the uprising would not be complete without addressing a large but central question: why is the current uprising different from the others which preceded it in both its comprehensiveness and political maturity? The answer to this question must begin with a consideration of two basic factors: first, the social composition of the occupied territories, and second, Israel's strategy towards the national movement, especially as it has unfolded in the 1980s.
Israel's policy of creating an economically dependent colony of the West Bank and Gaza Strip led Israel to tighten the noose on small and large productive enterprises, and on Palestinian agriculture. The lack of economic development in the occupied territories has resulted in scarcity of jobs for university graduates, resulting in large-scale unemployment in their ranks. They, along with many secondary school and college graduates, have had no option but to become laborers in whatever enterprises offered work in the occupied territories or in Israel. This same process of proletarianization has taken place with thousands of farmers in the occupied territories. The resultant change in the social composition of Palestinian society has reflected itself in the composition of the national movement. The table below illustrates this process of proletarianization.
The Wage Labor Force of the Occupied Territories
(thousands) Date Working in Israel Working in West Bank & Gaza Total
1970 20.6 152.7 173.3
1980 75.1 140.6 215.7
1985 86.1 153.5 239.6
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(Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986)
The years of occupation, particularly the late 1970s and early 1980s, were characterized by the important role played in the national movement by the middle class and the more educated strata, such as professionals academics and students. This reflected itself in their assumption of an important role in the leadership of the national movement. The uprisings of 1979/1980 and 1982, for example, were led by political figures representing some of the national institutions, including municipalities, professional associations, universities and charitable societies. These uprisings depended, to a large extent, on the role of the leadership drawn from such institutions. But the gradual increase in the political role and weight of the lower social strata - such as villagers and the inhabitants of refugee camps, who were the main two sources of the developing labor force - together with the attempt of the Israelis to attack the political leadership of former uprisings through arrest and deportation, led the national movement to adapt to these new circumstances. As a result, we now see a distinctive role played in the current uprising by peasants and refugees from the camps. In addition we also see an important role for workers, dramatized through their intermittent boycott of work in Israel. Moreover, we also witness a decline in the role of representatives of the middle class and figures from the national institutions. During the uprising for instance universities and other educational institutions have not been the main venues for confrontations with the occupation authorities, as they had been previously. There is no longer any need or possibility for the uprising to be led directly by these national figures. For the first time we are now witnessing an uprising led directly by the national forces in the field, with national figures and institutions playing a less important role.
This fundamental change was brought about by the fact that the active lower strata have not operated within 'the 'framework of these national institutions, but have been more directly connected with the national political forces. As a result the political oscillations and maneuvers which some of the representatives of the middle class are prone to have been absent from the present struggle.
The social strata that have played a major role in the current uprising are the very same ones which have most felt the burden of occupation. Hence these strata have been more loyal to the principle of national independence.
As an illustration of this, one can point to the failure faced by some local Palestinian personalities in their attempt to use the uprising to peddle their personal political goods. Their failure was due to the fact that what they attempted to sell was not in consonance with the political positions of the masses of the uprising.
These attempts appeared in statements of people like Sari Nusseibeh and Hanna Siniora. Their comments on the Shultz initiative, for example, only involved the point that Shultz should meet with a delegation representing Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories. They did not condemn the initiative. The position of the uprising, on the other hand, was unanimous and clear in its rejection of the principles upon which the initiative was based. This appeared clearly in the slogans carried and chanted during demonstrations, and in all the leaflets distributed during the uprising. The Shultz initiative was rejected because of its neglect of the principle of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state under the leadership of the PLO. The initiative was seen as an extension of the Camp David accords and was consequently rejected.
The changes brought about by the current popular uprising within the national movement have also had another important result. The uprising has weakened the social base of Jordan's influence in the territories. Jordan has worked hard to establish a base of support in preparation for a possible Israeli-Jordanian agreement, based, most recently, on the Peres-Hussein "London agreement". The uprising has brought considerable pressure to bear on the mayors who were appointed by the Israeli authorities in co-ordination with Jordan. As a result many have resigned.
Moreover, the leaflets and slogans of the uprising have made it clear that the "Jordanian option" is rejected because it is simply a transfer of repression from Israel to Jordan. Under the best of circumstances it would only amount to a division of political tutelage over the Palestinian people between Israel and Jordan. What has assisted in the rejection of the Jordanian option is that the masses in the,, occupied territories still remember the bitterness of political repression they endured during Jordanian rule over the West Bank. Jordan's persistent attempts to suppress the political and national identity of the Palestinian people are still very fresh in the collective memory.
The uprising has witnessed the emergence of popular committees, which have provided the organizational structure for both popular protest and for the provision of community services. Committees supervise food distribution, co-ordinate medical services, and supervise the implementation of communiqué directives.
Although these committees have, in many cases, become public during the uprising, they are the fruit of community-based activism, which has developed through the years of occupation. Organizations promoting self-help and community self-reliance, as well as explicitly political organizations, have developed deep roots
Within their communities. As mass organizations they are now identical with the forces which are leading the national movement.
The new popular content of the national movement, and its detachment from bureaucratic institutions, have made it possible for the leadership of the national movement in the occupied territories to be effective. The leadership has also been effective because of its presence in the occupied territories, at the scene of the battle, so to speak. Through its political loyalty to the PLO and its local presence, it has been possible for the leadership to interact creatively with the masses and their local committees. Because of these factors, and given that the local leadership of the national movement is also in harmony with the Palestinian national consensus, it has been possible for it to work effectively. It has played the role of field command, in both its political and non-political aspects.
This has been instrumental in the development and unfolding of the uprising and its various tactical responses in the process of struggle, responses which were appropriate for the specific local circumstances.
In conclusion,the popular uprising has thus far resulted in concrete developments and gains at different levels:
1. The uprising has altered the balance between the national movement in the occupied territories and the occupation authorities. The national movement has been strengthened, and the occupation authorities have admitted that it will be very difficult to return things to the way they were before the uprising. Self-confidence among the masses has increased, and morale has received a tremendous boost. One indicator of this new equilibrium is the routing out of known informers and agents of the occupation within the local population. An example of this is the self-dissolution of some of the Village League branches that were set up by the Israeli authorities to facilitate their rule. Another example is the surrender of weapons by many collaborators to the people as a sign of repentance.
2. As a result of the uprising, Israel has found itself in a defensive position. This was reflected in media coverage, particularly in the US and Western Europe, where Israel used to enjoy most favorable reporting. Israel's embassies, consulates and supporters have had trouble explaining the events and presenting Israel's point of view. The uprising has put the Palestinian question back in a prominent place in the international media after a period of relative neglect; the struggle of the Palestinians has won legitimization.
3. The uprising has placed new constraints upon certain prominent figures who previously showed signs of willingness to accept solutions which were unacceptable to the Palestinian people, such as the "Jordanian option" or "autonomy". These solutions aimed at a division of political and administrative control of the occupied territories between Israel and Jordan at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty. An example of this is the position of Elias Freij, the mayor of Bethlehem, and Rashad al-Shawwa, the former mayor of Gaza. Freij declared on the eve of the first visit by Shultz that while he accepted meeting with the visiting Secretary of State, he did not want to do so alone, unaccompanied by other Palestinians. And despite al-Shawwals former position supporting the Jordanian option, he recently declared in a meeting with the head of the southern command of the Israeli army that he does not see any credible solution except total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.
4. Finally, the uprising has strengthened the value which people within the national movement place in popular struggle, and it has enhanced its credibility as an option to achieve revolutionary results. This has led to a weakening of the role of bureaucratic elements within the national movement, to the extent that the uprising has increased confidence in popular action.
In addition, the uprising has weakened the idea that the national movement inside the occupied territories is a mere extension of the external PLO. Local leadership has often been perceived as an executor of instructions and a communicator of positions from the leadership outside. The uprising has strengthened the voice of those who view the relation as being interactive in such a way that gives the local leadership more room to maneuver. From this perspective flexibility is essential so that appropriate decisions can be made in light of concrete realities on the ground. It gives the leadership the right to share in political decision-making within the framework of the general unified stance adopted by the PLO.
Conclusion
The uprising has not been a spontaneous phenomenon; it is rather a mass-based movement of clear political content. It has generated a new dynamic whose hallmark is mature political consciousness among the Palestinian people.
The causes of the uprising cannot be reduced to a few Incidents, which immediately preceded its eruption. The uprising must be seen as a qualitatively distinct stage in a struggle, which was initiated over twenty years ago, between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian national movement.
The central issue of this struggle has been that of sovereignty. Israel's attempts to suppress and exploit the Palestinian population 'and to "normalize" the occupation have been met by the Palestinians' struggle to end the occupation and to realize Palestinian sovereignty by establishing an Independent state In the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The uprising represents a new stage in this movement, characterized by unprecedented intensity, built on a broad and popular organizational base. There is a new clarity and unity within the movement, which Is unequivocally demanding the right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state In the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of the PLO.
Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre
On 9th December, following a car accident in the Gaza Strip in which four Palestinians were killed, a period of sustained popular protest began which has become known as the uprising. The causes of this movement cannot be found in the individual events, which preceded the accident. Neither is the uprising simply a "spontaneous" expression of frustration with military occupation. The uprising can only be explained within the context of twenty years of political struggle between Israel and the Palestinians.
During this period Israel has attempted to consolidate the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, while exploiting its human and material resources for its own economic purposes. In opposition, the Palestinian national movement has been working to bring the occupation to an end. It is the dynamics of the conflict between these two opposing movements which have led to the current uprising, which represents a distinctive new phase in the struggle for an independent state.
Israeli Policy Towards the West Bank and Gaza
Israeli policies and practices since 1967 have aimed at affecting all aspects of life in the occupied territories; through controlling the political, economic, and social institutions, the occupation has sought to force the Palestinians into submission and to make them accept the status quo of military rule.
Israel has sought to reap the greatest possible economic benefit from the occupation, through a variety of legal and administrative measures instituted for that purpose.
The aggressive Israeli policy of land expropriation carried out over the past twenty years has resulted in the loss of 52% and 42% of the land in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip respectively. Land has been confiscated both for "security reasons" and for the construction of Israeli settlements, which have proliferated throughout the years of occupation.
Israeli control over water resources has also progressed rapidly, and has been a major cornerstone of the policy of control over the land. Legislation enacted by the Israelis stipulates that the amount of water allowed for Palestinian use should not exceed 90 to 100 million cubic meters annually until the year 2010. This means that Palestinians must maintain their water usage at the present level over the next two decades, while the Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will be granted a 100% increase in the amount of water they can use during the 1980s.
The Palestinian economy as a whole has been subject to a systematic policy of destruction. In addition to the appropriation of vital land and water resources, the Israelis have weakened the ability of Palestinian agricultural produce to compete with Israeli produce in the captive market which has been created since 1967. To this end, Israel has imposed production quotas on Palestinian farmers, and has systematically denied them the subsidies it provides to Israeli producers.
Palestinian industry and commerce are similarly restricted. Industrial enterprises are denied subsidies, and the granting of import licenses is almost exclusively restricted to Israelis. The granting of licenses to establish productive enterprises is subject to many restrictions; in Gaza, where citrus products comprise 70% of exports, Palestinians planning to establish a fruit canning plant were denied a permit to do so.
The exploitation of Palestinian laborers working in Israeli enterprises is the most vivid example of the colonial situation created since 1967. The low wages paid to Palestinian workers and the fact that they do not enjoy the social benefits provided to Israeli workers have made them into a source of great profit to the Israeli
economy. Palestinian fund and social security contributions are deducted from their salaries without being returned upon retirement.
The Israelis also reap enormous benefits from the various kinds of taxes and duties levied on Palestinians in the occupied territories. Figures for 1986 indicate that $150 million were channelled into the Israeli treasury from taxes and customs duties alone. Another $250 million were raised from water fees, and an estimated $470 million from tourism.
It is clear from the above that the occupation is a highly profitable enterprise for the Israelis.
The profits enjoyed by the Israeli occupation authorities are made possible by the minimization of expenditure for services rendered to the population of the occupied territories. The health sector is symptomatic of this willful neglect. Indices of unequal health services include the number of hospital beds, the per capita expenditure on health care, and the number of physicians per person. The West Bank and Gaza Strip have one tenth of the number of hospital beds per person available in Israel, while the per capita government expenditure on health is 8% of that spent in Israel. The ratio of physicians to population is one to 1000 as compared to 29 to 1000 in Israel. The latter statistic is particularly telling in view of the 320 unemployed doctors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip who are unable to find work in the underdeveloped public health sector.
The low level of expenditure in other areas of Palestinian life is also well documented. Public education, social welfare services, and municipal public works are examples of sectors kept underdeveloped by the Israeli occupation authorities.
Measures Taken Against the Palestinians since 1982
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Political killings 53 9 10 13 21 28
Deportations 0 1 4 30 11 8
Administrative detentions 0 0 0 129 3 143
House demolitions and sealings 18 22 3 51 77 109
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(Source: MERIP no. 150, Jan/Feb 1988)
These Israeli policies have been met over the past twenty years by sustained Palestinian resistance in many forms. Resistance, in turn, has been met by harsh measures. The record of Israeli repression of the Palestinian people under occupation is long and varied. It includes acts of collective and individual punishment such as destruction of homes and property, imposition of curfews on whole communities, forced closure of institutions and enterprises, the killing of hundreds of people, deportation of thousands of individuals, and the arbitrary arrest and detention of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The table above summarizes some of these measures taken against Palestinians since 1982.
Palestinian Resistance to Occupation
Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories has not been restricted to fighting Israeli policies forced upon the population. It has also developed in response to political and diplomatic activities viewed by the Palestinians as detrimental to and often aimed at suppressing their national aspirations. The most prominent of these struggles was waged in 1976 when the Israeli authorities tried, unsuccessfully, to put forth a "new leadership" through the holding of municipal elections. They hoped that the new "leadership" would accept the autonomy scheme subsumed under the rubric of the "Civil Administration", and that the demands for national sovereignty could be finally thwarted.
The Palestinian uprising of 1976 responded to these designs by electing nationalist figures into office. The elections were viewed as a popular referendum which dealt a decisive blow to the “Civil Administration” scheme designed to deprive Palestinians of national independence.
The uprising of 1979/80 was also directed against political efforts to stifle Palestinian demands for self-determination. Like the "Civil Administration" scheme, the Camp David accords negotiated by Anwar Sadat in Jerusalem and Washington were also designed to limit Palestinian authority to administrative matters, while keeping military and security affairs in the hands of Israel. Palestinian resistance to the Camp David version of autonomy was widespread: the clear demands of that time were the right to self-determination, the establishment of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, and the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
The Palestinian national movement also took a prominent role in pressing for the abrogation of the Jordanian-Palestinian accords which did not satisfy Palestinian demands for self-determination and statehood. The confederation with Jordan envisioned in these agreements also relegated the PLO to a peripheral role and denied it its status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
The Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories has developed and matured over the past twenty years and has consolidated a broad consensus on clear and realistic objectives for the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the diaspora. These objectives are national independence through the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the leadership of the PLO, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homeland. The movement has also developed a strong social foundation of grass-roots organization, and has thus been able to foil Israeli and Jordanian attempts to create an alternative leadership in the form of the Village Leagues or pro-Jordanian personalities such as Elias Freij and Rashad al-Shawwa. These attempts failed largely due to the fact that these groups and personalities lacked a genuine social base, and were therefore unable to attract a mass following.
Uprising
The December uprising in the occupied territories can only be understood within this historical context of increasing political maturity and organization at the mass level. The current uprising thus represents one phase in the history of the Palestinian national movement. Nevertheless, it is unique in its wide scope and intensity, in the clarity of its political content, and in the unity and maturity of
In terms of the scope and intensity of the confrontations between the Palestinians and the Israeli occupier, it is striking that in its first 100 days the uprising witnessed a daily average of one martyr, about 25 wounded, and 40 arrested. In addition, the confrontations have taken place in all sectors of Palestinian society, in cities, towns, villages, and refugee camps, and have involved individuals of all ages and social backgrounds. The demonstrations have also taken unprecedented proportions: those with over 1000 participants have been frequent, especially in heavily populated areas.
The Israeli response to this unprecedented uprising has been to take unprecedented measures to suppress it. Curfews of long duration have been imposed upon many areas; at one time in February, 25 communities in the Nablus area were placed under curfew, depriving over 135,000 persons of freedom of movement and means of earning their livelihood. The Nablus area curfew lasted 13 days.
The intensity of the confrontations led to a brutal policy of breaking limbs, introduced and justified by the Defense Minister himself. Thousands of Palestinian men, women, and children can testify to the wholesale assault on their persons.
Palestinians have responded collectively by breaking curfew orders, and by determining for their own communities the hours during which they conduct their commercial affairs. The commercial strikes have been tremendously successful,
despite the persistent efforts of the Israeli army to impose its own timetable for the opening and closing of places of business. Palestinians have also been successful in hindering or preventing, often for days at a time, army penetration of their communities, especially in refugee camps and villages. The army has thus resorted to the increased use of helicopters to move soldiers into barricaded communities, to pursue youths over the hilly terrain, and to drop tear gas into areas inaccessible to their ground forces.
At a different level, the uprising has been characterized by the spirit of unity and a high level of organization. Both qualities have been demonstrated clearly in the field. Demonstrations and conflict with the army have not been restricted to any one group among Palestinians. All have taken part. "Unified" popular committees have kept watch at night in an effort to provide some protection for villages and refugee camps against settlers' vigilante raids. Unified relief committees have been set up to distribute food and clothing to camps and villages under siege, and supplies have been collected from Palestinians from all walks of life. "Field committees" have also been established to administer the daily requirements and needs of the struggle. The committees have been able to overcome narrow special interests, and to work for the common good.
In addition, there has been no dissonance in the various calls for steps to be taken during the uprising. The common and narrow calculus of special interests, more familiar at other times, has not arisen in discussions and planning pertaining to the uprising.
This unity in the field has been reflected in unity of demands. The demands and slogans of the uprising have revolved around the need to implement United Nations resolutions concerning the protection of the civilian population in the occupied territories from the indiscriminate attacks of the army. The demands have also included putting an end to deportations, mass arrests, killings, beatings, the imposition of curfews, and the withdrawal of the army from populated areas (given that its presence is the chief provocative agent in these areas). Moreover, the national movement has called for the abolition of taxes imposed by the occupation authorities, since these taxes are levied upon the occupied population in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Demands have also been made for the reopening of schools, colleges and universities. All educational institutions in the West Bank have been closed by military order.
While these demands have been central in the uprising, the long-term vision of the solution to the Palestinian problem has not been neglected. The slogans of the uprising have been very clear: there is no possibility for a permanent solution without the participation of the PLO, the acceptance of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Leaflets distributed, bearing the signature of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, have also emphasized that the most suitable vehicle for arriving at a peace settlement is an international conference with full authority and which includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as the PLO.
The demands of the uprising have not only been clear; there has also been a consensus around them. This is obvious from the statements and leaflets issued by the leadership of the uprising and its popular committees. The political content of these declarations has been especially clear, and in particular the demand for national independence. This demand is also the main message of slogans chanted by demonstrators and painted on walls throughout the occupied territories.
But the process of outlining the salient features of the uprising would not be complete without addressing a large but central question: why is the current uprising different from the others which preceded it in both its comprehensiveness and political maturity? The answer to this question must begin with a consideration of two basic factors: first, the social composition of the occupied territories, and second, Israel's strategy towards the national movement, especially as it has unfolded in the 1980s.
Israel's policy of creating an economically dependent colony of the West Bank and Gaza Strip led Israel to tighten the noose on small and large productive enterprises, and on Palestinian agriculture. The lack of economic development in the occupied territories has resulted in scarcity of jobs for university graduates, resulting in large-scale unemployment in their ranks. They, along with many secondary school and college graduates, have had no option but to become laborers in whatever enterprises offered work in the occupied territories or in Israel. This same process of proletarianization has taken place with thousands of farmers in the occupied territories. The resultant change in the social composition of Palestinian society has reflected itself in the composition of the national movement. The table below illustrates this process of proletarianization.
The Wage Labor Force of the Occupied Territories
(thousands) Date Working in Israel Working in West Bank & Gaza Total
1970 20.6 152.7 173.3
1980 75.1 140.6 215.7
1985 86.1 153.5 239.6
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(Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986)
The years of occupation, particularly the late 1970s and early 1980s, were characterized by the important role played in the national movement by the middle class and the more educated strata, such as professionals academics and students. This reflected itself in their assumption of an important role in the leadership of the national movement. The uprisings of 1979/1980 and 1982, for example, were led by political figures representing some of the national institutions, including municipalities, professional associations, universities and charitable societies. These uprisings depended, to a large extent, on the role of the leadership drawn from such institutions. But the gradual increase in the political role and weight of the lower social strata - such as villagers and the inhabitants of refugee camps, who were the main two sources of the developing labor force - together with the attempt of the Israelis to attack the political leadership of former uprisings through arrest and deportation, led the national movement to adapt to these new circumstances. As a result, we now see a distinctive role played in the current uprising by peasants and refugees from the camps. In addition we also see an important role for workers, dramatized through their intermittent boycott of work in Israel. Moreover, we also witness a decline in the role of representatives of the middle class and figures from the national institutions. During the uprising for instance universities and other educational institutions have not been the main venues for confrontations with the occupation authorities, as they had been previously. There is no longer any need or possibility for the uprising to be led directly by these national figures. For the first time we are now witnessing an uprising led directly by the national forces in the field, with national figures and institutions playing a less important role.
This fundamental change was brought about by the fact that the active lower strata have not operated within 'the 'framework of these national institutions, but have been more directly connected with the national political forces. As a result the political oscillations and maneuvers which some of the representatives of the middle class are prone to have been absent from the present struggle.
The social strata that have played a major role in the current uprising are the very same ones which have most felt the burden of occupation. Hence these strata have been more loyal to the principle of national independence.
As an illustration of this, one can point to the failure faced by some local Palestinian personalities in their attempt to use the uprising to peddle their personal political goods. Their failure was due to the fact that what they attempted to sell was not in consonance with the political positions of the masses of the uprising.
These attempts appeared in statements of people like Sari Nusseibeh and Hanna Siniora. Their comments on the Shultz initiative, for example, only involved the point that Shultz should meet with a delegation representing Palestinians inside and outside the occupied territories. They did not condemn the initiative. The position of the uprising, on the other hand, was unanimous and clear in its rejection of the principles upon which the initiative was based. This appeared clearly in the slogans carried and chanted during demonstrations, and in all the leaflets distributed during the uprising. The Shultz initiative was rejected because of its neglect of the principle of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state under the leadership of the PLO. The initiative was seen as an extension of the Camp David accords and was consequently rejected.
The changes brought about by the current popular uprising within the national movement have also had another important result. The uprising has weakened the social base of Jordan's influence in the territories. Jordan has worked hard to establish a base of support in preparation for a possible Israeli-Jordanian agreement, based, most recently, on the Peres-Hussein "London agreement". The uprising has brought considerable pressure to bear on the mayors who were appointed by the Israeli authorities in co-ordination with Jordan. As a result many have resigned.
Moreover, the leaflets and slogans of the uprising have made it clear that the "Jordanian option" is rejected because it is simply a transfer of repression from Israel to Jordan. Under the best of circumstances it would only amount to a division of political tutelage over the Palestinian people between Israel and Jordan. What has assisted in the rejection of the Jordanian option is that the masses in the,, occupied territories still remember the bitterness of political repression they endured during Jordanian rule over the West Bank. Jordan's persistent attempts to suppress the political and national identity of the Palestinian people are still very fresh in the collective memory.
The uprising has witnessed the emergence of popular committees, which have provided the organizational structure for both popular protest and for the provision of community services. Committees supervise food distribution, co-ordinate medical services, and supervise the implementation of communiqué directives.
Although these committees have, in many cases, become public during the uprising, they are the fruit of community-based activism, which has developed through the years of occupation. Organizations promoting self-help and community self-reliance, as well as explicitly political organizations, have developed deep roots
Within their communities. As mass organizations they are now identical with the forces which are leading the national movement.
The new popular content of the national movement, and its detachment from bureaucratic institutions, have made it possible for the leadership of the national movement in the occupied territories to be effective. The leadership has also been effective because of its presence in the occupied territories, at the scene of the battle, so to speak. Through its political loyalty to the PLO and its local presence, it has been possible for the leadership to interact creatively with the masses and their local committees. Because of these factors, and given that the local leadership of the national movement is also in harmony with the Palestinian national consensus, it has been possible for it to work effectively. It has played the role of field command, in both its political and non-political aspects.
This has been instrumental in the development and unfolding of the uprising and its various tactical responses in the process of struggle, responses which were appropriate for the specific local circumstances.
In conclusion,the popular uprising has thus far resulted in concrete developments and gains at different levels:
1. The uprising has altered the balance between the national movement in the occupied territories and the occupation authorities. The national movement has been strengthened, and the occupation authorities have admitted that it will be very difficult to return things to the way they were before the uprising. Self-confidence among the masses has increased, and morale has received a tremendous boost. One indicator of this new equilibrium is the routing out of known informers and agents of the occupation within the local population. An example of this is the self-dissolution of some of the Village League branches that were set up by the Israeli authorities to facilitate their rule. Another example is the surrender of weapons by many collaborators to the people as a sign of repentance.
2. As a result of the uprising, Israel has found itself in a defensive position. This was reflected in media coverage, particularly in the US and Western Europe, where Israel used to enjoy most favorable reporting. Israel's embassies, consulates and supporters have had trouble explaining the events and presenting Israel's point of view. The uprising has put the Palestinian question back in a prominent place in the international media after a period of relative neglect; the struggle of the Palestinians has won legitimization.
3. The uprising has placed new constraints upon certain prominent figures who previously showed signs of willingness to accept solutions which were unacceptable to the Palestinian people, such as the "Jordanian option" or "autonomy". These solutions aimed at a division of political and administrative control of the occupied territories between Israel and Jordan at the expense of Palestinian sovereignty. An example of this is the position of Elias Freij, the mayor of Bethlehem, and Rashad al-Shawwa, the former mayor of Gaza. Freij declared on the eve of the first visit by Shultz that while he accepted meeting with the visiting Secretary of State, he did not want to do so alone, unaccompanied by other Palestinians. And despite al-Shawwals former position supporting the Jordanian option, he recently declared in a meeting with the head of the southern command of the Israeli army that he does not see any credible solution except total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.
4. Finally, the uprising has strengthened the value which people within the national movement place in popular struggle, and it has enhanced its credibility as an option to achieve revolutionary results. This has led to a weakening of the role of bureaucratic elements within the national movement, to the extent that the uprising has increased confidence in popular action.
In addition, the uprising has weakened the idea that the national movement inside the occupied territories is a mere extension of the external PLO. Local leadership has often been perceived as an executor of instructions and a communicator of positions from the leadership outside. The uprising has strengthened the voice of those who view the relation as being interactive in such a way that gives the local leadership more room to maneuver. From this perspective flexibility is essential so that appropriate decisions can be made in light of concrete realities on the ground. It gives the leadership the right to share in political decision-making within the framework of the general unified stance adopted by the PLO.
Conclusion
The uprising has not been a spontaneous phenomenon; it is rather a mass-based movement of clear political content. It has generated a new dynamic whose hallmark is mature political consciousness among the Palestinian people.
The causes of the uprising cannot be reduced to a few Incidents, which immediately preceded its eruption. The uprising must be seen as a qualitatively distinct stage in a struggle, which was initiated over twenty years ago, between the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian national movement.
The central issue of this struggle has been that of sovereignty. Israel's attempts to suppress and exploit the Palestinian population 'and to "normalize" the occupation have been met by the Palestinians' struggle to end the occupation and to realize Palestinian sovereignty by establishing an Independent state In the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The uprising represents a new stage in this movement, characterized by unprecedented intensity, built on a broad and popular organizational base. There is a new clarity and unity within the movement, which Is unequivocally demanding the right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state In the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of the PLO.
Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre
posted by HRM Deborah of Israel and the Messenger of Peace at 4:57 PM
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